WASHINGTON, DC – A year ago, the Middle East seemed primed for a breakthrough: normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. More broadly, US President Joe Biden’s administration was touting a de-escalation of tensions across the region. The US even seemed to have reached some informal understandings with Iran, not enforcing oil sanctions and permitting it to receive several billion dollars in payments from Iraq for natural gas and electricity. In return, Iran was to dilute some of the uranium it had enriched to 60% (near weapons grade) and bar its Shia proxies from firing at US forces in Iraq and Syria.
Then came the horrific Hamas attack of October 7. With Hamas embedded in densely populated areas of Gaza, and its leaders and fighters hidden in tunnels, Israel faced a cruel dilemma: target Hamas leaders, fighters, and military infrastructure, and kill large numbers of civilians, or spare Gaza and permit Hamas to prepare to attack Israel again.
After October 7, no Israeli government could forego trying to destroy Hamas. The price for Gaza has been devastating. And for Israel, the war in Gaza has cost the lives of several hundred soldiers and increased the country’s international isolation.
While it remains unclear whether Israel and Iran will engage in a conflict that proves difficult to contain, there are now possibilities for dramatic change for the better in the region. This will require that Israel keep in mind that its remarkable military achievements need to be translated into political outcomes.
Consider that Israel has destroyed 23 of Hamas’s 24 battalions, together with its command-and-control structures and a significant part of its military infrastructure (arms depots, weapon labs and production facilities, and tunnels). Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu stated at the United Nations that 90% of Hamas’s rockets are gone.
Israel has also dramatically weakened Hezbollah – Iran’s most important proxy, which provided shock troops for Iranian interventions across the region and trained other Iranian-backed militias, helping them to develop and produce their own weapons. In addition, tens of thousands of Hezbollah missiles served as a deterrent against Israel striking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
Hezbollah’s weakening denies Iran one of its main tools of intimidation and coercion, and creates an opportunity for the Lebanese state to reclaim its sovereignty over all of its territory. What Iran calls the “axis of resistance” looks far less threatening today.
Moreover, Iran’s losses have probably also already triggered an internal debate about the high cost of supporting its proxies – an investment that now looks to have been largely lost. True, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps holds the upper hand in these debates, but those questioning may have an effect over time.
Of course, Israel’s retaliation against Iran for its recent missile barrage, and Iran’s response, could wreak more havoc in the region. But if the head-to-head conflict is contained and ends soon, the Biden administration should act to take advantage of the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah.
Several steps can be taken. First, Biden should try to reach an agreement with Netanyahu on what constitutes success, so that Netanyahu can end the Gaza war, provided the remaining hostages taken from Israel on October 7 are released. Netanyahu will need to see very real mechanisms for preventing smuggling and cutting off funding to Hamas so it cannot reconstitute itself as a military threat.
In addition, Netanyahu will want to know there is a plan for Arab and international forces to administer Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) can play that role. Netanyahu does not want to be in Gaza forever and needs to know that there is an alternative to Hamas. Yes, some of Netanyahu’s ministers, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, will resist returning control of Gaza to the PA in the future. But Netanyahu is politically stronger now, given Israel’s military achievements, and he understands that without a Palestinian alternative to Hamas, there will be a political vacuum likely to be filled by extremists.
Biden and his team also need to complete the Saudi-Israeli normalization deal. The Saudis won’t do it unless and until the war ends, which should help motivate Netanyahu to claim success and conclude the conflict.
Donald Trump would certainly like to finalize such a deal should he return to the White House, but a fundamental Saudi condition for normalization with Israel is a defense treaty with the US. Biden can muster the two-thirds majority necessary in the Senate to adopt a treaty, because the Republicans will support it and Biden will get whatever Democratic votes he needs, especially as this would be his last act. But given Democrats’ views of Trump, and of the Saudis, they are unlikely to give Trump the votes he would need. (In the best case, Trump would need at least 15 Democratic senators to support such a treaty, which is unlikely to happen).
Saudi-Israeli normalization would have a transformative effect in the region in no small part because it requires what US Secretary of State Antony Blinken calls a “credible pathway to a Palestinian state” that is time-bound and condition-based. The latter means that Palestinians will have to demonstrate that a Palestinian state will not be failed state, a threat to either Israel or Jordan, or an Islamist partner to rejectionists in the region.
In the current setting, with Israel having weakened the threats against it, a breakthrough with the Saudis would allow Netanyahu to show how – notwithstanding the calamity of October 7, 2023 – he transformed the region, Israeli security, and Israel’s prospects for the future. And, given the high costs of the war, the prospect of much foreign investment in Israel and deals with the Gulf states will be vital.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, for his part, would gain a defense treaty with the US – which no other country in the region, including Israel, has – as well as a partnership with the US on nuclear energy, renewables, and artificial intelligence, in addition to a pathway for Palestinian statehood. And Biden could say he was able to end the war and produce a more hopeful future for the region.
None of this is a given. But the defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah – and the weakening of the Iranian axis – must be seen in strategic terms. Put simply, it creates an opening to transform not just Gaza and Lebanon, but much of the region.
© Project Syndicate 1995–2024
