PARIS – Failing to heed the lessons of past wars is a surefire recipe for future conflicts. While it is too early to draw all the relevant lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine, some are readily apparent. Ignoring them will leave Europe vulnerable for years to come.
The first and most important lesson is that European countries must respond much faster to emerging military crises. Just as police cars, firefighters, and ambulances use sirens to signal urgency – knowing that the speed with which they reach the scene can determine whether lives are saved or lost – governments and institutions need their own administrative “sirens” to ensure timely and effective responses.
The war in Ukraine has underscored the urgent need for the European Union, its member states, and institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Europe Development Bank to establish processes for fast-tracking infrastructure and, when relevant, defense spending. When Russia bombs Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure, for example, or when the bulk of Ukrainian trade is redirected from sea lanes to land routes, the EU and other international partners must be able to respond quickly by building cross-border electricity lines and reinforcing other critical infrastructure, such as bridges or border crossings across Central Europe. It must also accelerate the construction of EU-compatible rail systems across the Baltic states, which still use Soviet track gauge.
The EU could take a page from the playbooks of other countries that have dealt with similar challenges. In 1950, the United States adopted the Defense Production Act, which has since been used to fast-track spending on both military and non-military priorities, from developing hypersonic missiles to advancing the green transition through solar-panel production.
More recently, Germany responded to the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine with its LNG Acceleration Act, expediting the construction of terminals for liquefied natural gas imports. The Netherlands is poised to follow suit with similar legislation, while the United Kingdom has experimented with a “spiral development” approach to military acquisitions, prioritizing speed over perfection by fast-tracking the production of “good enough” equipment to meet urgent security needs.
To overcome its chronic sluggishness and cumbersome bureaucratic processes, the EU needs its own Defense Production Act. This would enable the bloc to address threats from hostile powers more promptly and improve preparedness for security crises.
The second lesson of the Ukraine war is that rearming, building infrastructure, and deterring hostile forces require substantial investment. To meet these demands, the EU must make it much easier to reallocate existing resources, such as the cohesion funds that support poorer member states, the Next Generation EU recovery program, and EIB loans.
But repurposing existing funds is not enough. Winning wars requires sustained, long-term financial commitments. During World War II, the US Lend-Lease program provided allies like the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union with military equipment, food, and other resources. The Soviets settled their debt in 1972, while the UK paid its final loan installment in December 2006.
European countries must recognize that they are no longer in peacetime and secure the necessary funds to protect themselves. Borrowing even half of the amount mobilized by the EU during the COVID-19 crisis could make a difference. For example, a long-term financial commitment of €500 billion ($525 billion) over the next 50 years, or even 100 years, could make a big difference in supporting Ukraine’s defense capacity and keep the Russian military far from NATO borders.
The war in Ukraine has already prompted structural reforms and an increase defense spending at the national and EU levels. Accelerating the implementation of these measures will be crucial to strengthening Europe’s ability to respond to emerging threats.
But although speed is paramount, Europe must confront a sobering reality: its security challenges are likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Even if a ceasefire in Ukraine were reached soon – a big if – the risk of another Russian attack would remain alarmingly high.
Given this reality, European leaders have a responsibility to prevent Russia from getting even closer to EU and NATO borders. To this end, they must ensure that Ukraine has the capacity to withstand Russian aggression for decades, if necessary.
Moreover, for Ukraine to achieve lasting peace – not just a ceasefire that collapses after a few years – it must either join NATO or bolster its defenses to the point that any Russian offensive becomes too difficult and costly to pursue. Maintaining a robust international military presence will also be essential for deterring aggression.
South Korea offers a useful model. The heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the Korean Peninsula has remained intact for 71 years because it is virtually impregnable. Meanwhile, the continued presence of US troops in South Korea has helped maintain stability, even in the absence of a formal peace agreement.
The last obvious lesson of the war in Ukraine is not new: the best way to restore peace is to support allies in defending it. The US helped its European allies win two world wars not because it faced an immediate threat from Europe, but because it understood that letting its allies fall would ultimately bring the danger to its doorstep. Now, the danger is at Europe’s doorstep, and it is the EU’s turn to step up. RSS #Nepal
Nicu Popescu, a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, is a former minister of foreign affairs and European integration of Moldova.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025.
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